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This note analyzes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants by Georgia and neighboring Southern
long-arm statutes and
jurisdictions, focusing on their use of their long-ann
service of process requirements
requirements (whether embodied in statute or court
rule).'I The specific focus is whether the covered jurisdictions
jurisdictions permit
rule).
exercise so-called
so-called general jurisdiction-in
their courts to exercise
jurisdiction-in other words,
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an action not
arising from the defendant's
defendant's contacts with the forum state.
state?
presenting an abbreviated
abbreviated history of the United
This Note starts by presenting
courts'
States Supreme Court's major decisions relating
relating to state courts'
defendants, with
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants,
particular
attention
to
the
three
cases
which
in
the
United
particular
United States
3
Supreme
Supreme Court has discussed general jurisdiction. This Note then
examines
long-arm laws
examines the long-arm
laws and, where
where relevant, service
service of process

* Mr. Ashe graduated from the Georgia State University College of Law in May 2009 where he
• Mr. Ashe graduated from the Georgia State University College of Law in May 2009 where he
was
of the
Bondurant, Mixson
the Law
Law Review.
Review. He
He practices
practices law
law at
at Bondurant,
Mixson &
& Elmore
Elmore LLP
LLP in
was aa Legislative
Legislative Editor
Editor of
Atlanta
Atlanta and is a certified
certified barbeque judge.
judge.
+
Georgia State
+ Mr.
Mr. Hall
Hall graduated
graduated from
from the
the Georgia
State University
University College
College of
ofLaw
Law in
in May
May 2009
2009 where he was
was
aa Lead
Lead Articles
Articles Editor
Editor of
of the
the Law
Law Review.
*o Mr.
Mr. Jackson
Jackson is
is an
an associate
associate at the firm
fmn of Tisinger
Tisinger Vance,
Vance, P.C.,
P.C., in
in Carrollton,
Carrollton, Georgia.
Georgia. He
He
graduated
graduated from
from the
the Georgia
Georgia State
State University
University College
College of
of Law
Law in
in May
May 2008.
2008.
1.
I. See infra
infra section
section H.
II.
2.
2. For
For aa discussion
discussion of
of general
general jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, see
see ROBERT
ROBERT C.
C. CASAD
CASAD & WILLIAM
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN,
RICHMAN,
JURISDICTION
JURISDICTION IN
IN CIVIL
CIVIL ACTIONs
ACTIONS 139-44
139-44 (3d
(3d ed.
ed. 1998).
1998). For
For criticism
criticism of the
the concept
concept of
of general
general
jurisdiction,
General Jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, see
see generally
generally Mary
Mary Twitchell,
Twitchell, The
The Myth
Myth of
o/General
Jurisdiction, 101
101 HARv.
HARv. L. REV.
REv. 610
610
(1988).
(1988).
3.
3. See
See Perkins
Perkins v.
v. Benguet
Benguet Consol.
Consol. Mining
Mining Co.,
Co., 342
342 U.S.
U.S. 437
437 (1952);
(1952); Helicopteros
Helicopteros Nacionales
Nacionales de
de
Colombia,
Colombia, S.A.
S.A. v.
v. Hall,
Hall, 466
466 U.S.
U.S. 408
408 (1984);
(1984); Burnham
Burnham v. Superior
Superior Court
Court of
of Cal.,
Cal., 495 U.S.
U.S. 604
604 (1990).
(1990).
For
ofthese
these cases,
cases, see
see infra text
text accompanying
accompanying notes
notes 30-40.
30-40.
For discussion
discussion of

1177
1177

Published by Reading Room, 2009
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1177 2008-2009

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 1
1178
1178

GEORGIA
GEORGIA STATE
STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[VoL
(VoL 25:4
25:4

rules in Georgia
Georgia and other Southern
Southern states to understand
understand
4
4
contemporary practices.
practices. The
The jurisdictions
jurisdictions are categorized
categorized on the
contemporary
whether they
they permit
permit their courts
courts to exercise
exercise general
general
basis of whether
5
jurisdiction
jurisdiction and,
and, if
if so, under what circumstances.
circumstances. For each
each
jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, the
the relevant
relevant statutes, regulations, and case law
law are
evaluated
evaluated to determine
determine how
how the exercise
exercise of jurisdiction
jurisdiction is authorized.66
concludes by proposing a revision
revision to the Georgia long-arm
long-arm statute,
It concludes
which would bring
bring Georgia into
into line with the majority of states
which
courts
studied,
by
permitting
courts to exercise
exercise personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction
Georgia
studied,
14th
to the limits imposed
imposed by the Due Process
Process Clause
Clause of the 14th
Amendment
Amendment to the United
United States Constitution,
Constitution, including
including general
77
jurisdiction.
A. Background
announced a
The
The United
United States Supreme
Supreme Court has over the years announced
variety
variety of justifications
justifications for limiting the exercise
exercise of personal
personal
jurisdiction
jurisdiction by a state over
over a nonresident
nonresident defendant.88 While this note
does not remotely
remotely purport to describe or evaluate
evaluate what the
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction are, some
constitutional
exercise of personal
constitutional limits on the exercise
Supreme Court precedent
understanding
United States
States Supreme
precedent on this
understanding of United
evaluating modem practices by the states. The
topic is useful in evaluating
twentieth century away from the
evolution (or revolution) in the twentieth
'power'
theory
embodied
in
Pennoyer
v. Neff
evaluation
Neff towards an evaluation
'power' theory embodied in Pennoyer v.
of whether
whether the exercise of personal
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction in a particular case
of fair play and substantial
notions
would "offend
"offend 'traditional
'traditional
towards the
justice'"
permitted states to adopt a variety of approaches towards
justice"' permitted
9
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Those approaches
approaches are the main
States Supreme
Supreme Court has
topic of this Note. Specifically, the United States
H.
4. See infra section II.
H.
5. See infra section II.
H.
6. See infra section II.
III.
7. See infra Section III.
supranote 2, at 67-178.
& RICHMAN,
RICHMAN, supra
8. CASAD &
(1945)
(1878); int'I
Int'l Shoe
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878);
9. Pennoyer v. Neff,
infra in
in the text accompanying notes
(1940)), discussed
457, 463 (1940»,
discussed infra
(citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463
20-29.
2{}-29.
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affirmed and reaffinned
reaffirmed the existence of what it has described
affinned
described as
jurisdiction
general jurisdiction, namely a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction
defendant in a cause of action not arising from that
over a nonresident defendant
forum state.
with the
defendant's contacts with
the forum
state. 10
10
In the beginning, there was Pennoyer,
Pennoyer, and it was good. Decided in
Pennoyer v. Neff
Neff "for nearly a century
century served as the basic
1878, Pennoyer
14th
statement of the limits on state court jurisdiction imposed
imposed by the 14th
Amendment
clause."" In striking down an Oregon
Amendment due process
process clause.,,11
Oregon state
nonresident who did not appear in court,
court judgment
judgment against a nonresident
was not present in Oregon, and did not live in Oregon on the basis
that the Oregon state court could not validly exercise
exercise personal
jurisdiction
jurisdiction over the nonresident, Pennoyer
Pennoyer established that "due
"due
process essentially
essentially limits the personal
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction of state courts to
12 The
the three traditional
traditional bases of consent, presence, and domicile."'
domicile.,,12
"territorial
"territorial power theory"
theory" that Pennoyer
Pennoyer embraced "treated
"treated the States
as nearly independent sovereigns,"
sovereigns," and was focused almost entirely
entirely
3
on the physical presence of the defendant
1 The result
defendant or his property. 13
result
of the focus on territorial power was that "a
"a state has absolute
absolute power
power
over defendants or property found within its territorial boundaries,
regardless
dispute."' 14 As a necessary
regardless of the nature of the dispute.,,14
necessary corollary, a
nonresidents who did not own
state had very little power over nonresidents
property
boundaries, and that limitation eventually
eventually "caused
"caused
property within its boundaries,
Pennoyer] to fall out of step with the realities
[the power theory from Pennoyer]
defendants.'IS5
corporate defendants.
over corporate
life,"
of twentieth
twentieth century
century life," particularly
particularly over
Some states used statutes requiring corporations doing business in
their state "to appoint agents for service of process .. . . and
and
designat[e]
receive such service if the corporation
designat[ e] a state official to receive
failed to appoint an agent" to create a fictive fonn
form of corporate
6 Another theory used was that a nonresident
consent to jurisdiction.'
jurisdiction. 16
nonresident
10.
11.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
IS.
16.

accompanying text.
See infra
infra notes 30-41 and accompanying
& RICHMAN,
RICHmAN, supra
supranote 2, at 6S.
68.
CASAD &
Id.at 68,
Id.
6S, 70.
Id.
Id. at 71-72.
Twitchell, supra
supra note 2,
2, at 619.
619.
RICHMAN, supra
supranote 2, at SO.
80.
CASAD &
& RICHMAN,
Id. at 77; Twitchell,
Twitchell, supra
supranote 2,
Id.
2, at 620.
620.
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"'present' wherever
corporation was "'present'
wherever it was doing business and could
be sued in the courts
of
that
state just as a nonresident individual
courts
17
found there could be."'
be."I7 These theories were used by some states to
justify jurisdiction
jurisdiction over corporate defendants
defendants not just in actions
arising from the corporation's specific activities
activities within the forum
i
state, but also in other causes
of
action.1
causes
action. IS As one commentator has
noted, "the legacy of these rules is a strand of general jurisdiction
jurisdiction
theory that recognizes
recognizes relatively
relatively unlimited jurisdiction over corporate
commercial ties with the
and individual defendants
defendants having certain commercial
19
forum.,,19
forum."'
B. International
Washington
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
International
Washington began a "doctrinal
International Shoe Co.
Co. v. Washington
"doctrinal revolution.
revolution.
. . best viewed as a shift in the conceptual
state-court
conceptual basis of state-court
20 In
jurisdiction from power towards fundamental fairness."
fairness. ,,20
abandoning the requirement
requirement of the defendant's
abandoning
defendant's presence
presence within the
forum state, the Court established that due process
process would only
only
require that a defendant not present in the forum state "have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional
'traditional notions of fair play and
21
substantial justice."'
justice. ",21 The Court held that the demands of due
process "may
"may be met by such contacts
contacts of the corporation with the
reasonable, in the context of our federal
state of the forum as make it reasonable,
system of government, to require the corporation
corporation to defend the
22
particular suit which is brought there.
there.,,22
In rejecting a "mechanical
"mechanical or quantitative"
quantitative" approach towards
determining what contacts
contacts would suffice to justify the exercise of
of
RICHMAN, supra
supranote 2, at
17. CASAD
CASAD && RICHMAN,
at 78.
7S.
18. Id.
IS.
/d. at 77; Twitchell,
Twitchell, supra
supra note 2,
2, at 621.
621.
supra note
19. Twitchell,
Twitchell, supra
note 2,2, at 622.
RICHMAN, supra
supranote 2,
20. CASAD
CASAD && RICHMAN,
2, atat 81.
SI.
21.
310, 316 (1945)(citing
(1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
21. Int'l
Int'J Shoe Co.
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
U.S. 310,316
(1940)).
463 (1940».
22. Id.
Id. at317.
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jurisdiction, the
the Court
Court emphasized
emphasized that courts
courts must evaluate
evaluate the
the
jurisdiction,
"quality
and
nature
of
the
[defendant's]
activity
in
relation
to
"quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation the fair
fair
23
when
that
and
orderly
administration
of
the
laws.
,,23
The
Court
noted
that
when
noted
The
Court
laws."
of
the
and orderly administration
corporation conducted
conducted activities
activities within
within a state,
state, it was
was enjoying
enjoying the
the
aa corporation
"benefits and
and protection
protection of
of the
the laws
laws of that
that state,"
state," and that
that the
the
"benefits
24 The Court
"exercise
of
that
privilege
may
give
rise
to
obligations."
"exercise of that privilege may give
to obligations.,,24
"those
cases
where
that
in
to
explain
went
on
of
went on to
cases where "those obligations
obligations arise out of
or are
are connected
connected with
with the activities
activities within
within the
the state,
state, a procedure
procedure
or
to enforce
which requires the corporation
corporation to respond
respond to a suit brought
enforce
which
25
undue.,
be
to
said
be
hardly
instances,
in most
be said to be undue. ,,25
them can, in
quotation
preceding
The
immediately
The immediately preceding quotation suggests that a state
state can
can
presumptively exercise
exercise jurisdiction
jurisdiction over
over a nonresident
nonresident defendant
defendant for
presumptively
causes of action
action arising from that defendant's
defendant's contacts
contacts with the forum
state (what would later be deemed specific
specific jurisdiction).
jurisdiction). The Court
in
which the continuous
also noted that "there have been instances
instances
of
corporate operations
substantial and of
operations within a state were thought so substantial
such a nature as to justify
justify suit against it on causes of action arising
activities"--in other words,
from dealings
dealings entirely distinct from those activities"-in
general jurisdiction.2266
While International
unresolvedInternationalShoe left a number of questions unresolvedwhich numerous cases during the subsequent sixty years have tried to
analyze them,
address-this Note does not attempt to catalog or analyze
because that ground has been well-plowed
well-plowed previously.27
previously. 27 The specific
question relevant for the survey undertaken in Section II is whether a
state court may, consistent with due process, exercise general
jurisdiction-that is, personal jurisdiction over a nonpresent
23. Id.
Id.at
at 319.
319.
24. Id.
Id.
24.
Id.
25. Id.
25.
specific/general jurisdiction distinction is
source of the specific/general
commonly attributed
attributed source
at 318. The
The commonly
26. Id.
Id.at
26.
L.
79 MARv.
HARv. L.
SuggestedAnalysis, 79
Adjudicate: A Suggested
Arthur von
Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:
Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction
von Mehren && Donald
supra
Twitchell, supra
see generally Twitchell,
note 2, at
at 139-44;
139-44; see
supra note
(1966); see
see also Casad && Richman, supra
REv.
REV. 1121
1121 (1966);
note 2.
After
in Cyberspace
Cyberspace After
Contacts in
Minimum Contacts
What Constitutes
Constitutes Minimum
B.Bossin,
Bossin, Note,
Note, What
e.g., Joanna B.
27. See,
See, e.g.,
L. REv.
REV.
13 GA.
GA. Sr.
ST. U. L.
New Regime?,
Regime?, 13
for aa New
New Rules
Rules Necessary
Necessaryfor
Compuserve, Inc.
Inc. v.
v. Patterson:
Patterson: Are New
&
2; von
von Mehren
Mehren &
supra note
note 2;
Twitchell, supra
supra note
note 2; Twitchell,
RICHMAN, supra
CASAD && RICHMAN,
524-26 (\997);
(1997); CASAD
521, 524-26
521,
supranote
note 26.
Trautman, supra
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contacts. 28
forum contacts?8
defendant, on claims unrelated to the defendant's forum
The United States Supreme Court, in three decisions following
International
Shoe, consistently
consistently held the answer
International Shoe,
answer is yes, albeit only in
29
29
limited circumstances.
circumstances. Again, this Note does not evaluate those
cases, but rather describes them in summary fashion so as to
practices described
illuminate the survey of current
illuminate
current state practices
described in Section
II.
C.
States Supreme
Supreme Court
Court &
& General
Jurisdiction
C. The United
United States
General Jurisdiction

1. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Consolidated Mining
Mining Co.
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court held that Ohio could
validly exercise personal jurisdiction
action not
jurisdiction "to enforce a cause of action
30
forum.",,30
the
of
state
the
in
[defendant's] activities
activities in the state of the forum.
arising out of the [defendant's]
The defendant in this case was a Philippine company whose president
and principal stockholder, after being forced to leave
leave the Philippines
during World
War
II,
moved
to
Ohio,
opened
an office there, and
World
"carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic
generally "carried
supervision of the necessarily
supervision
necessarily limited wartime
wartime activities
activities of the
3
1
company.", The cause of action did not arise in Ohio, nor did it
company.,,31
"relate to
to the
corporation's activities
activities there.,,32
there." 32 The Court's holding,
"relate
the corporation's
permitting
"proceeding in personam to enforce a cause of action not
permitting "proceeding
arising out of the corporation's
corporation's activities
activities in the state of the forum,"
explicitly built on the language
language from International
International Shoe regarding
regarding
"continuous
corporate
operations
within
a
state"
that
were
"so
"continuous corporate operations within a state"
"so
substantial and of such a nature"
nature" that they could justify suit against a
substantial
defendant on causes
defendant's forum
defendant
causes of action unrelated to the defendant's
33

contacts. 33

28. See infra section II;
I; CASAD & RICHMAN,
RICHMAN, supra
supra note 2, at 140.
29. See Perkins
(1952), Helicopteros
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
U.S. 437 (1952),
Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A.
Hall, 466
U.S. 408
(1984); Burnham
Burnham v. Superior
of Cal.,
Cal., 495
495 U.S.
(1990).
Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S.
408 (1984);
Superior Court
Court of
U.S. 604
604 (1990).
30. Perkins,
Perkins,342
342 U.S. atat 446.
446.
31.
Id.at
at 447-48.
447-48.
31. [d.
32. Id.
[d. at 438.
33. Id.
at446
Int'l Shoe
Shoe v. Washington,
Washington, 326
326 U.s.
U.S. 310,
310, 318
318 (1945)).
[d. at
446 (citing
(citing Int'I
(1945».
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2. Helicopteros Nacionales
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall
Supreme Court addressed the question
In 1984, the United States Supreme
question
corporation could be sued in Texas over a
of whether a Colombian corporation
34 The plaintiffs asserted
helicopter
helicopter crash in Peru. 34
asserted that the
corporation's
corporation's purchases of helicopters in Texas, the training of its
sufficient
pilots in Texas, and a solitary negotiation
negotiation in Texas were sufficient
contacts to permit Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction, even though
the plaintiffs conceded
conceded that the suit did not arise out of and was not
35 The Court ultimately held that those
related
related to those contacts.35
"the kind of continuous and systematic general
contacts were not "the
general
contacts ... found [] in Perkins,"
accordingly Texas
Perkins," and that accordingly
business contacts...
36 The Court also
could not exercise
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. 36
reaffirmed the rule from Perkins
Perkins that upon a showing of continuous
continuous
be
and systematic
systematic contacts with a forum state, a defendant would be
subject to suit there "[e]ven
"[e ]ven when the cause of action does not arise
arise
corporation's activities in the forum
out of or relate to the foreign corporation's
State.'.37
'general
State."3 7 In a footnote, the Court expressly applied the 'general
exercise of "personal
jurisdiction'
jurisdiction' label for an exercise
"personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction over a
defendant's
defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's
forum." 38
the forum.',38
contacts with the
Main
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin
3. Burnham
Supreme Court case arguably involving
The final United States Supreme
involving the
Superior Court
Court of
Burnam v. Superior
exercise of general jurisdiction, Burnam
of
"unanimously
California,
California, was decided in 1990 when the Court ''unanimously
upheld the constitutionality
constitutionality of jurisdiction
jurisdiction over a nonresident who
state." 39 While there
with
process
while
visiting the state.',39
had been served
was no majority opinion-two
opinion-two groups of four Justices each
(1984).
34. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
HaU, 466 U.S. 408,
408, 409-10
409-10 (1984).
35. Id.
Id. at
at 411,415.
411, 415.
36. Id.
Id. at
at 416,
416, 418-19.
418-19.
37. Id.
Id. at
at 414.
414.
38. Id.
Id. at
at 414
414 n.9.
n.9.
of Cal.,
Sup. Court
Court of
CASAD &
supra note
note 2,
2, at
122-23 (discussing
39. CASAD
39.
& RiCHMAN,
RICHMAN, supra
at 122-23
(discussing Burnham v. Sup.
Ca\., 495
495
(1990)).
U.S. 604 (1990».
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"emphatically rejected the other's rationale" while Justice Stevens
"emphatically
"declin[ed]
"declin[
ed] to agree with either side" in his separate opinion-there
"clear holding.',40
holding." 40 The Court unanimously agreed
was nonetheless a "clear
circumstances, physical presence alone would
that absent unusual circumstances,
suffice to permit the exercise of general jurisdiction
jurisdiction over a
41
defendant. 41
Although state courts are quick to repeat the mantra that their
jurisdiction extends to the limits of constitutional
constitutional due process,
process, many
State long arm statutes do not appear to provide for the exercise of
general jurisdiction. 42 This is partly the result of the chronology of
43 After the Supreme Court's decision
extra territorial jurisdiction.43
in
InternationalShoe,
Shoe, many state legislatures passed long arm statutes
International
which they believed reached
reached to the limits of due process. 44 However,
these statutes were passed before the Supreme
Supreme Court fully developed
its personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence.
jurisdiction jurisprudence. 45 Thus, "codifying
"codifying what the
courts had already decided tended to freeze in place the approved
categories and did not allow the courts to continue to define the limits
categories
modem-scenario cases that arose
as their contours
contours became
became clear in modem-scenario
46
after International
InternationalShoe."
examines several
section examines
Shoe. ,,46 The following section
of Georgia's sister southern states (and Florida) to determine whether
whether
opportunity to exercise
they have taken advantage of the opportunity
exercise general
jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, and if so, under what
what circumstances
circumstances and with what
what basis.

40.
RiCHMAN, supra
123, 127.
40. CASAD
CASAD &
& RICHMAN,
supra note
note 2, at 123,
127.
41.
41. Id.
Id. at 127.
127.
42.
42. Jeffrey
Jeffrey A. Van
Van Detta
Detta &
& Shiv
Shiv K.
K. Kapoor,
Kapoor, Extraterritorial
Extrate"itorial Personal
Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction for
for the TwentyFirst
Long-Arm Statute to Codify
Codify and Refine
Refine
First Century:
Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing
Reconceptualizing the Typical Long-Arm
International
International Shoe
Shoe After Its First
First Sixty Years, 33 SEToN
SETON HALL
HALL CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT REv.
REv. 339,
339, 345-46
345-46 (2007).
43.
43. Id.
Id. at 345-46.
44.
44. Id.
Id.
45.
45. Id.
Id. at 346.
46. Id.
!d.
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I. STATE SURVEY
SURVEY

A.
A. Alabama
Alabama is a full general
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction state because
because its service of
of
process
process rules authorize service with only minimum contacts:

[O]utside
in
[O]utside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in
this state when the person or entity has such contacts
contacts with this
state that the prosecution
prosecution of the action against the person or
inconsistent with the constitution of this
entity in this state is not inconsistent
47
state or the Constitution of the United States.47
The rule then goes on to provide
provide that in an action against a "person or
or
entity [] sued in the capacity
capacity of guardian of a ward, or executor,
representative of an estate, for the
administrator, or other personal representative
permitted
acts or omissions of a decedent or ward"
ward" service
service will be permitted
sufficient contacts or the
either if the person or entity being sued has sufficient
the
48
48
decedent or ward did. This rule was amended in 2004 to remove the
so-called "laundry
sufficient to justify out-of-state
so-called
"laundry list" of contacts
contacts sufficient
interpretation of the
service of process in light of consistent interpretation
49
due process.
process. 49
of
federal
to
the
extent
as
going
clause
"catchall"
"catchall" clause as going to the extent of federal due
The Alabama Supreme
Supreme Court
Court has interpreted
interpreted this rule to extend
extend
"the
"the personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction of Alabama
Alabama courts to the limit of due
process
Constitutions."5 The
process under the United States
States and Alabama
Alabama Constitutions.,,50

47. ALA. R. CN.
CIv. P. 4.2(b).

48. Id.
Id.
49. See Committee
Amendment to Rule 4.2 Effective
1, 2004. The so-called
so-called
Committee Comments to Amendment
Effective August 1,2004.
"laundry
list" used
4.2(a)(2)(A)-(H). The
"catch-all" clause was contained in
The former
former "catch-all"
in
"laundry list"
used to
to be
be former
former Rule
Rule 4.2(a)(2)(A}-(H).
former
Kleef, 830
former Rule 4.2(a)(2)(1),
4.2(a)(2)(l), as discussed
discussed in Elliott v. Van Kleef,
830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002). For an
example
extending to the limits of due process, see id
example of a case interpreting
interpreting the prior catch-all clause as extending
id
at 730; see also
also Martin v. Robbins, 628 So. 2d 614, 617
617 (Ala. 1993). The order amending Rule 4.2,
Alabama
1, 2004, is published
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure,
Procedure, effective
effective August 1,2004,
published in the volume
volume of the Alabama
Reporter
well-reasoned
Reporter that contains Alabama cases from 867 So. 2d. For an illuminating
illuminating and well-reasoned
discussion
Alabama rule,
discussion of the prior
prior Alabama
rule, as well as advocacy
advocacy of adoption
adoption of such a rule in Georgia by a
preeminent
Short Reach:
Reach: The
jurisprudence, see E.R. Lanier, Long Arm, Short
preeminent figure in the study of Georgia jurisprudence,
Dilemma a/Georgia's
of Georgia'sLong Arm
Dec./Jan. 1990,
Arm Statute, The Verdict,
Verdict, Dec.lJan.
1990, at 22.
50.
J. C.
Duke &
& Assocs.
Assocs. Gen.
Gen. Contractors
v. West,
West, 991
So. 2d
194, 197
197 (Ala.
2008).
50. 1.
C. Duke
Contractors v.
991 So.
2d 194,
(Ala. 2008).
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practical
practical effect is to extend Alabama
Alabama courts'
courts' jurisdiction
jurisdiction out to the
Supreme Court has
limits of federal due process: the Alabama
Alabama Supreme
"[w]hen
clarified that "[
w ]hen applying Rule 4.2(b), this Court has interpreted
interpreted
the due process guaranteed
guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution
Constitution as
coextensive with that guaranteed under the United States
Constitution." 51 The Alabama Supreme Court has explicitly
Constitution.,,51
explicitly
reaffirmed-the theory of general
adopted-and recently reaffirmed-the
general personal
jurisdiction
"consist of the
jurisdiction arising from general contacts, which "consist
defendant's contacts with the forum state that are unrelated52to the
and systematic."'
'continuous and
systematic. ",52
cause of action and that are both 'continuous
B. Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas is a full general jurisdiction
jurisdiction state, explicitly provided by
53
statute.53 The relevant
relevant code section provides
provides that Arkansas courts
statute.
"shall
have
personal
jurisdiction
of
all
"shall have personal jurisdiction of all persons,
persons, and all causes of
of
action or claims
claims for relief,
relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the
clause of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment of the
due process of law clause
54
Constitution." Arkansas
accordingly
United States Constitution.,,54
Arkansas courts have accordingly
"Fourteenth Amendment due-process
jurisprudence when
looked to "Fourteenth
due-process
jurisprudence
55
jurisdiction.
personal
of
issue
an
deciding
personal jurisdiction. ,,55
The Supreme Court of Arkansas
explicitly discussed the
Arkansas first explicitly
emergence of general
emergence
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction in Arkansas when construing a
Davis v. St.
St.
1995 amendment
amendment to the Arkansas long-arm statute in Davis
56
Johns
2002.56 In Davis,
Davis, the Supreme Court of
Johns Health
Health Sys. in 2002.
of
Arkansas noted that the legislature's
legislature's deletion
deletion of "the requirement
requirement that
specific
action arise out of the nonresident
nonresident defendant's specific
the cause of action
51.
51. Id.
Id
52. Id.
Id. at 197-98
197-98 (citing Helicopteros
Helicopteros Nacionales
Nacionales de
de Colombia,
Colombia, S.A. v.v. Hall, 466
466 U.S. 408,
408, 414 n.9,
n.9,
(1984)).
415 (1984».
53.
53. ARK. CODEANN.
CODE ANN. § I16-4-10i(B).
6-4-101 (B).
54. Id.
Id
55.
Sys., 71
S.W.3d
55. Payne
Payne v.v. France,
France, 282
282 S.W.3d 760, 765
765 (Ark. 2008); Davis
Davis v.v. St.
St. Johns Health Sys.,
71 S.W.3d
55,
Arkansas courts
courts
55, 58 (Ark.
(Ark. 2002) (explaining
(explaining that
that "when deciding
deciding an issue of personal jurisdiction,"
jurisdiction," Arkansas
"look[] only to Fourteenth Amendment due
should "lookO
due process
process jurisprudence" following the
the 1995
1995 revisions
revisions
long-arm statute, 1995 Ark. Acts
to the Arkansas long-ann
Acts 486,
486, codified asas ARK. CODE ANN. § I16-4-101(B)).
6-4-1 0I (B».
56. Davis,
Davis, 71 S.W.3d at
at 57-59.
57-59. The amendment was
was 1995 Ark. Acts
Acts 486, codified as
as ARK. CODE
CODE
ANN.§ 16-4-101(B).
ANN.
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contacts with the
the state ....
allowed [Arkansas]
[Arkansas] to exercise
exercise general
general
. . allowed
contacts
57
of the
the due
due process
process clause.
clause. ,,57 The
The
jurisdiction up to
to the
the limits of
jurisdiction
reaffirmed
Arkansas has
has repeatedly
repeatedly reaffirmed its
its
Supreme Court
Court of Arkansas
Supreme
commitment to
to general
general jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, describing
describing it as
as arising in
commitment
"situations
"situations in
in which
which aa nonresident
nonresident defendant's
defendant's contacts
contacts with a forum
forum
substantial and
and continuous
continuous as to
to justify
justify jurisdiction
jurisdiction
state may be so substantial
state
over that defendant,
defendant, even
even though the
the cause
cause of action
action is 'entirely
'entirely
over
58 Arkansas
the
that
distinct
from
those
activities.
",58
Arkansas
requires
the
requires
activities.'
those
from
distinct
defendant's contacts with Arkansas
Arkansas be
be "continuous,
"continuous, systematic,
systematic, and
defendant's
59
general
exercise
to
courts
their
substantial"
order for their
to exercise general jurisdiction.
jurisdiction. 59
substantial" in order
C. Florida
Florida
C.
60
provides
The State of Florida
Florida60
provides its courts
courts with full general
jurisdiction, in a statute that contains both
both specific
specific jurisdiction
jurisdiction
jurisdiction,
61
61
jurisdiction.
general
conferring
positive
elements
and
a
statement
conferring
general
jurisdiction.
elements
Section 48.193(1)
48.193(1) of the Florida
Florida statute is the specific jurisdiction
jurisdiction
Section
portion, containing eight specific scenarios which suffice to provide
provide
62
Section
Florida courts with specific
specific jurisdiction over a claim. Section
48.193(2) confers
confers general
general jurisdiction upon Florida courts over a
engaged in substantial and not isolated activity
"defendant
"defendant who is engaged
within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate,
63
activity.",,63
that activity.
from that
arises from
claim arises
... whether or not the claim
or otherwise ...

57. Davis,
(explaining that "[b]y Act 486, the General Assembly authorized
Davis, 71 S.W.3d. at 59 (explaining
"[t]he
extent due process will allow," and that "[t]he
to the fullest extent
Arkansas courts to exercise jurisdiction to
purposes of personal
state for pwposes
general-jurisdiction state
convert Arkansas into a general-jurisdiction
effect of this
to convert
this change was to
jurisdiction").
58. [d.
Id. at 58.
466 U.S.
v. Hall,
Hall, 466
(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
59. Payne,
at 766 (citing
Payne, 282 S.W.3d at
S.W.3d at 58-59.
Davis, 71 S.W.3d
(1984)); Davis,
408, 414 n.9, 415 (1984»;
408,414
include the
to include
thoroughness, to
and thoroughness,
consistency and
the sake
sake of geographic consistency
60. The authors
authors decided, for the
BBQ
THE BBQ
state. See.
See, e.g., THE
Southern state.
in fact
fact a Southern
whether it isis in
about whether
doubts about
state
state of Florida despite serious doubts
SONG,
at http://www.youtube.comlwatch?v=6ubTQfr_tyY.
http://www.youtube.com/wath?v=6ubTQfrtyY.
availableat
SONG, available
(Fla. Dist.
Dist.
So. 2d 511, 516 (Fla.
v. Romero,
Romero, 975 So.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN.
see also
alsoHaueter-Herranz v.
ANN. §§ 48.193;
48.193; see
"the long-arm
long-arm
explaining ''the
and explaining
over defendants
defendants and
existed over
Ct.
general jurisdiction existed
(finding general
2008) (finding
Ct. App. 2008)
48.193(2)
section 48.193(2)
of personal
personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction under section
categories of
statute
two categories
provides for two
statute provides
state" prong).
act "within
"within this state"
48.193(1)(b)"--the
section 48.193(1)(b
and
)"~e tortious act
and specific jurisdiction under section
62. FLA. STAT. ANN.
48.193(l)(a)-(h).
ANN. §§ 48.193(1)(a}-{h).
48.193(2).
ANN. §§ 48.193(2).
FLA. STAT. ANN.
63. FLA.
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interpreted the "substantial
"substantial and not isolated
Florida courts have interpreted
isolated
activity"
"continuous and systematic general
activity" language as meaning "continuous
64 This interpretation has been
business contact" with Florida. 64
imposed
general
imposed to bring the Florida long-arm statute's conferral of general
compliance with federal due process requirements,
jurisdiction into compliance
requirements,
as "enunciated
"enunciated by the [United States] Supreme Court 10
in
65
Helicopteros."
interpretation has made the statutory
Helicopteros.,,65
This interpretation
requirement
coterminous
of
requirement coterminous with the due-process
due-process required
required showing of
66
minimum contacts
contacts between the defendant
defendant and Florida. 66

D. Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia is a specific
specific jurisdiction
jurisdiction only state. Georgia's long-arm
9-10-91, only confers specific
specific jurisdiction: it only
statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91,
provides for the exercise of personal
of
personal jurisdiction over causes
causes of
action "arising
"arisingfrom any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use or
67 While Georgia
possession enumerated.,
enumerated.,,67
Georgia courts frequently say that
they interpret
interpret the Georgia
Georgia long-arm
long-arm statute
statute as extending as far as due
68
permit, Georgia courts have in fact-with one recent
recent
process will permit,68
anomaly-consistently interpreted
interpreted the statute as not extending as far
anomaly-consistently
as due process would allow by permitting general jurisdiction
jurisdiction as well
as specific
specific jurisdiction, but instead have required the cause of action
69
to arise from the defendant's
approach
This approach
defendant's contacts with Georgia. 69
See, e.g., Gadea v. Star
64. See,
Star Cruises, Ltd.,
Ltd., 949 So. 2d
2d 1143,
1143, 1145 (Fla.
(Fla. Dist.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
2007); Nw.
Nw.
Aircraft
Stewart, 842
842 So.
190, 195
(Fla. Dist.
Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
2003).
Aircraft Capital
Capital Corp.
Corp. v.v. Stewart,
So. 2d
2d 190,
195 (Fla.
Ct. App.
65. Woods
Nova Cos.
Cos. Belize
Belize Ltd.,
739 So.
2d 617,
620 (Fla.
(Fla. Dist.
Dist. Ct.
App. 1999)
1999) (explaining
65.
Woods v.v. Nova
Ltd., 739
So. 2d
617, 620
Ct. App.
(explaining
"[t]his
and systematic'
contacts standard
standard was
was the
by the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court
"[t]his 'continuous
'continuous and
systematic' contacts
the standard
standard enunciated
enunciated by
in Helicopteros
sufficient to
to fulfill
fulfill the
of minimum
minimum contacts
when asserting
asserting
in
He/icopteros as
as sufficient
the due
due process
process requirements
requirements of
contacts when
general
general jurisdiction").
jurisdiction").
id.("Because
66. See id.
("Because section
section 48.193(2) requires this
this high threshold, if the defendant's
defendant's activities
activities meet
the
the requirements
requirements of section 48.193(2),
48.193(2), minimum contacts
contacts [are]
[are] also satisfied.").
satisfied.").
67. O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91
9-10-91 (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
67.
See, e.g., SES
SES Indus.,
Inc. v.
lntertrade Packaging
Packaging Mach.
Mach. Corp.,
512 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 316,
(Ga. Ct.
Ct.
68. See,
Indus., Inc.
v. Intertrade
Corp., 512
316, 318
318 (Ga.
App.
App. 1999) (explaining that Georgia
Georgia courts
courts "have consistently held
held that our Long-Arm Statute
Statute confers
jurisdiction
jurisdiction over
over nonresidents to the
the maximum
maximum extent
extent permitted by due process").
process").
.
See, e.g., Innovative
69. See,
Innovative Clinical
Clinical && Consulting Servs., LLC
LLC v. First Nat'l Bank of
of Ames,
Ames, 620
620 S.E.2d
352,
354-55 (Ga.
(Ga. 2005)
2005) (discussing
(discussing how
how the
the "plain
and unambiguous
unambiguous language"
language" in
in subsection
(3) of
352,354-55
"plain and
subsection (3)
of the
the
courts' consistent "literal
"literal construction"
construction" of itit have precluded
Georgia long-arm
long-arm statute
statute and Georgia courts'
precluded
Georgia courts
courts "from exercising personal jurisdiction over
over the nonresident
nonresident to the
the fullest
fullest extent
extent permitted
permitted
by
(1987); Aero Toy
by constitutional
constitutional due
due process");
process"); Gust
Gust v. Flint, 356
356 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1987);
Toy Store, LLC v.v.
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differs
other Southern
Southern states
states whose
long-arm statutes
differs from
from other
whose long-arm
statutes contain
contain
limiting
language-such
"arising under"
under" or
or "arising
"arising from.,,70
from." 70 In
limiting language-such as
as "arising
those
states, appellate
appellate courts
courts have
have simply
simply ignored
ignored the
the limiting
limiting
those states,
language
and purported
purported to
exercise general
language and
to exercise
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction under
under aa
771
statute
not appear
appear to
it. ' The
(virtual) unanimity
statute that
that does
does not
to support
support it.
The (virtual)
unanimity of
of
Georgia
courts
on
this topic,
topic, oddly,
oddly, has
not constrained
constrained federal
federal courts
courts
Georgia courts on this
has not
interpreting
statute: they
they have
interpreting Georgia's
Georgia's long-arm
long-arm statute:
have routinely
routinely
construed
as providing
general jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, usually
usually without
without
construed it
it as
providing general
72
discussing
Georgia precedent
to the
the contrary.
discussing Georgia
precedent to
contrary.72
The
Georgia
Court of
Appeals case
case of
of Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v.
The Georgia Court
of Appeals
Motors Corp.
Colemon recently
recently broke
from the
the prior
undiminished line
line by
by
Coleman
broke sharply
sharply from
prior undiminished
permitting
the exercise
of general
based upon
upon the
permitting the
exercise of
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction based
the
defendant's
"continuous and
systematic business
defendant's "continuous
and systematic
business contact"
contact" with
73
Georgia.
Court of
in Coleman
Colemon cited
cited Innovative
Innovative
Georgia. 73 The
The Court
of Appeals
Appeals in
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting Services v. First
First Nat'l
Nat ' Bank of Ames for
for the
Clinical
the
74
that prong
idea
of the
the Georgia
long arm
arm statute
was to
to be
be read
read
idea that
prong one
one of
Georgia long
statute74 was
as
forms of
of personal
personal jurisdiction
permitted by
as conferring
conferring all
all forms
jurisdiction permitted
by
Grieves,
Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)
2006) (noting
(noting aa requirement
requirement that the suit must arise
arise out of
of
defendant's
defendant's contacts with Georgia
Georgia and that accordingly Georgia's
Georgia's long-arm
long-arm statute
statute did not authorize the
the
exercise
exercise of general
general jurisdiction);
jurisdiction); Pratt &
& Whitney
Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders, 460 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 94, 96, 97 (Ga.
(Ga.
Ct. App. 1995)
1995) (explaining
(explaining that "the
''the exercise
exercise of personal
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction over [a nonresident]
nonresident] requires
requires that
that
the cause of action
[Georgia]"); Shellenberger
S.E.2d
action arise out of its activities within [Georgia]");
Shellenberger v. Tanner, 227 S.E.2d
266, 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing the prior version of Georgia's long-arm
long-arm statute that also
also
contained the "arise
contained
"arise from"
from" requirement).
ll.J Tennessee;
Tennessee; II.K
u.K Texas.
70. See discussion
discussion infra Sections IIJ
71. See discussion
II.J Tennessee;
Tennessee; II.K
ILK Texas.
71.
discussion infra Sections IIJ
See, e.g., Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews,
738, 745-49 (11th
(11th Cir. 2002) (using
(using
72. See,
Matthews, 291 F.3d 738,745-49
the Georgia long-arm
long-arm statute to exercise general jurisdiction
jurisdiction over a Florida defendant
defendant in Georgia);
Georgia);
Francosteel Corp. v. MN Charm, 19 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1994) (claiming "Georgia's
Francosteel
"Georgia's long arm
statute confers
confers in personam
personam jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the due process clause of the
federal Constitution");
Innovative Clinical
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting Servs.,
Seres., 620 S.E.2d at 354 n.2 (discussing
(discussing
Constitution"); Innovative
federal courts'
courts' continued "erroneous"
interpretation of the Georgia
"erroneous" interpretation
Georgia long-arm statute as extending as far
1:07as federal due process will permit). But see Baynes
Baynes v. George
George E. Mason Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:07CV-2805-JOF, 2008 WL 5191808,
5191808, at ·3
*3 (N.D.
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 10,2008)
10, 2008) (discussing
Clinical &
&
CV-2805-JOF,
(discussing Innovative
Innovative Clinical
Consulting
Consulting Services and Aero Toy Store in holding
holding that the Georgia
Georgia long arm statute required that the
cause of action arise
connected to the defendant's
arise from or be connected
defendant's contact
contact with Georgia).
Ct. App. 2008), cert.
cert. denied,
73. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Colemon, 658 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 843, 846-47 (Ga. Ct.
denied,
Ga. Supreme
certiorari was
Supreme Court (2008).
(2008). The petition for certiorari
was docketed March 25, 2008, and was docket
S08CI1164.
164. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied
number S08C
denied the petition on June 30, 2008 and denied a
motion for reconsideration on July 25, 2008. Georgia Supreme
http://www.gasupreme.us/
Supreme Court, http://www.gasupreme.us!
docketsearch/results one record.php?docr case num-S08C 1164 (last visited October, 2009).
docket_search/results_one_record.php?docr_case_num=S08CII64
74. O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1).
9-10-91(1).
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defendant's
procedural due process. 75 The opinion then dismissed the defendant's
argument
"arise out of' their contacts with
argument that the case did not "arise
Georgia
Georgia on the logic that general
general jurisdiction permits personal
jurisdiction
jurisdiction even through unrelated contacts, was consistent with due
process, and was justified because of the defendant's
defendant's "continuous
"continuous and
and
76
Georgia.
with
contact" with Georgia. 76
systematic
systematic business contact"
Notably, the Colemon court only analyzed due process
requirements
requirements for the exercise
exercise of personal jurisdiction, and did not
address
the
conflict
between
the preamble language
language in the Georgia
Georgia
address
conflict
77
long-arm
statute--"a cause of action arising
arisingfrom"
-in its finding
long-arm statute-"a
jrom,,77-in
that general
available to Georgia courts. Nor did it
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction was available
attempt to reconcile this new holding with the previous
previous line of cases
78
78
rejecting general
general jurisdiction in Georgia. The defendants
defendants filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of Georgia, but the
Supreme Court of Georgia
denied the petition and a subsequent
subsequent
79
79
reconsideration.
motion for reconsideration.
Innovative
In the 2005 case relied upon by the Colemon court, Innovative
Clinical
&
Consulting
Services,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Georgia
Georgia
Clinical & Consulting Services,
overturned
artificially constrained
overturned several prior cases that had artificially
constrained the
long-arm statute-the transacting
reach of prong one of Georgia's long-arm
prong-and explicitly
business prong-and
explicitly construed it to reach as far as
80
permitted by due process.
That opinion, however, also reaffirmed
process.80
the Court's interpretation of prong three of the long-arm statute (a
tortious injury in Georgia, caused by act or omission outside Georgia)
as not extending as far as due process permits, and rejected the notion
that Georgia
Georgia courts could ignore the "plain and unambiguous
unambiguous

75. Mitsubishi
9-10-91(1) and Innovative
Innovative
Mitsubishi Motors
Motors Corp., 658 S.E.2d at 845 (discussing O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1)
Clinical
& Consulting
Clinical &
Consulting Servs).
76. Id.
Id. at 846-47.
77.
77. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (emphasis added).
78. Mitsubishi
Corp., 658 S.E.2d at 846-47; see supra
Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,
supra note 69.
79. See source cited supra
supra note 73.
80. Innovative Clinical
& Consulting
Consulting Servs. v.
v. First
Clinical &
First Nat 'I' Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga.
9-10-91(1)); see also Aero Toy Store,
Store, LLC v. Grieves,
Grieves, 631
App. 2005)
2005) (construing
(construing O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1»;
631 S.E.2d
734, 738-39 (Ga.
Clinical&
& Consulting
734,738-39
(Ga. App. 2006) (discussing the holding of Innovative Clinical
Consulting Servs.).
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language" of the statute and "interpret
"interpret
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 to provide
language"
8'
omit."
to
chose
what the Legislature chose to omit.,,81
While the Supreme Court in Innovative
Innovative Clinical
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting
Services did emphasize that prong one should be read as "reaching
"reaching []
[]
'to the maximum extent permitted
'to
permitted by procedural
procedural due process,"'
process, '" it did
did
not address the interaction with the statutory
statutory language
language that arguably
keeps Georgia a specific jurisdiction state notwithstanding the new
interpretation
one-in other words, the "arising from"
interpretation of prong one-in
82 As further
language
9-10-91. 82
language in the preamble to O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 9_10_91.
evidence
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting Services did not
evidence that Innovative
Innovative Clinical
abandon the "arising
"arising from" limitation, the Georgia Supreme
Supreme Court
lamented
the
Georgia
General
Assembly's
continued
refusal "to
lamented
provide the maximum protection
protection for Georgia residents
residents damaged
damaged by
by
the out-of-state acts or omissions committed
committed by nonresident
nonresident
tortfeasors";
the
Court
also
reaffirmed
tortfeasors";
reaffirmed that separation of powers
"inappropriate" for the judiciary
"reject the plain
would make it "inappropriate"
judiciary to "reject
83
language
statute.,,83 Accordingly,
Accordingly, the implication
implication the Colemon
language of a statute.
court apparently read into Innovative
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting
Innovative Clinical
Services-that is, the judicial abandonment
Services-that
abandonment of the requirement that
the cause of action arise from the contact serving as the basis for
jurisdiction appears unjustified. Further, the record
record in Innovative
Innovative
Clinical&
ConsultingServices contained
contained no evidence
evidence of any contacts
& Consulting
Clinical
by the defendant bank
bank with Georgia aside from those with the
"continuous and systematic" contacts sufficient to
plaintiff, much less "continuous
justify general jurisdiction, meaning Innovative
Clinical &
Innovative Clinical
Consulting
Services cannot
specific
anything other than a specific
Consulting Services
cannot be read as anything
84
84
jurisdiction case.
81. Innovative Clinical
620 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at
355.
81.
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting Servs., 620
at 355.
Wood-Mosaic Corp.,
Corp., 195
S.E.2d 399,401
399, 401 (Ga.
App. 1973»;
1973));
82. Id.
Id. (citing Coe
Coe && Payne Co. v.v. Wood-Mosaic
195 S.E.2d
(Ga. App.
accorddiscussion of Pratt
& Whitney Canada,
Inc.v.
Sanders, 460
accord
Pratt &
Canada. Inc.
v. Sanders,
460 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. App.
App. 1995)
1995) inin Aero
Toy Store,
Store, 631 S.E.2d at
at 739.
739.
83. Innovative Clinical
Clinical &
& Consulting
Consulting Servs., 620 S.E.2d at 355.
355.
84. Id.
Id. at 356 (briefly
(briefly discussing defendant's contacts with
with Georgia and directing readers
readers to the
of those
Nat'l Bank of
of Ames
Ames v.
Court of
of Appeals
Appeals opinion for further
further explanation of
those contacts:
contacts: First
First Nat'l
v.
overruled by
Innovative Clinical && Consulting Servs., LLC, 598
598 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga.
(Ga. Ct. App.
App. 2004), overruled
Innovative Clinical
Clinical && Consulting
Consulting Servs., LLC, 620 S.E.2d at 356)
356) (Ga. 2005)).
2005».
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E. Kentucky
Kentucky
Kentucky appears
appears to be aa general
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction state, despite
despite having
having
85
a long-arm
long-arm statute
statute that textually
textually only confers
confers specific
specific jurisdiction.85
The
The statute
statute uses
uses the
the "arising
"arising from" language,
language, goes on
on to enumerate
enumerate
several
several actions,
actions, and
and then states "[w]hen
"[w]hen jurisdiction
jurisdiction over aa person is
based solely
solely upon this section, only a claim arising from acts
86 Kentucky
Kentucky
enumerated in this section may be asserted
asserted against
against him."
him. ,,86
enumerated
"have
interpreted
this
statute
to
authorize
courts,
courts, however,
however,
interpreted
authorize in
personam
personam jurisdiction
jurisdiction to reach
reach the outer limits of
of the due process
process
clause
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
Amendments to the United
United States
States
clause of the Fifth
87
Constitution.,,87 Kentucky courts
courts have
have interpreted
interpreted the "transacting
"transacting
Constitution."
sustained
any business"
business" prong
prong to permit
permit litigation over injuries sustained
KY.
REV.
STAT.
in
outside
Kentucky,
the
language
outside
language
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
8
454.210(2)(b)
454.21 O(2)(b) notwithstanding.
notwithstanding. 88
The Supreme
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Kentucky in fact expressly
expressly rejected
rejected an
an
argument
argument that the statutory
statutory language
language limited
limited Kentucky
Kentucky courts to
to
Kentucky:
hearing
only
claims
arising
from
contact
with
hearing
In practice, the precise
precise language of the statute and the application
application
of its terms are much
much less important
important than the simple fact that the
statute exists. Courts have determined that "the
"the long-arm statute
within this jurisdiction
jurisdiction allows Kentucky
Kentucky courts to reach to the
constitutional limits of due process in entertaining
full constitutional
jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants." 89
jurisdiction
non-resident defendants."s9

suggesting
In practice
notwithstanding the statutory language
practice then, notwithstanding
language suggesting
Kentucky
Kentucky is a specific
specific jurisdiction
jurisdiction only state, Kentucky courts assert

85.
85.

KY. REv.
REV. STAT.
STAT. ANN.
ANN. § 454.210.
454.210.
Ky.
Id.§ 454.210(2)(a}-(b).
454.210(2)(a)-(b).
86. [d.
77, 84 (Ky.
(Ky. 2007); Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc.,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Cummings v. Pitman, 239 S.W.3d 77,84
87. See.
675
675 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Ky. Ct.
Ct. App.
App. 1984).
2005-CA-001843-MR, 2007 WL
Perry County Hosp., Nos. 2005-CA-000591-MR,
88. See Elder
Elder v. Perry
2005-CA-000591-MR, 2005-CA-OOI843-MR,
Mohler, 675 S.W.2d at 407.
2685007
2685007 atat *4, 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); see also Mohler,
Mohler, 675 S.W.2d at
89. Wilson v.v. Case, 85
85 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2002) (citing Mohler,
at 405).
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that they exercise general jurisdiction
jurisdiction out to the limits permitted by
by
"
the United States Constitution.99o
Confusion, however, arises from the test Kentucky courts purport
to use in evaluating a defendant's contacts with Kentucky. As the
Supreme Court of Kentucky recently explained, it applies a "threeprong jurisdictional
jurisdictional test to evaluate a defendant's contacts with
prong
jurisdiction..,
long-arm jurisdiction
. . . and jurisdiction
jurisdiction
[Kentucky] for purposes of long-arm
9
satisfied." ' This test is routinely
routinely
will lie only where all three are satisfied.,,91
92
long-arm jurisdiction.
analyzing long-arm
courts analyzing
Kentucky courts
by Kentucky
cited verbatim by
jurisdiction.92
The first and third prongs present no particular analytical challenge:
"purposefully
they respectively
respectively require a) that the defendant have "purposefully
or
availed himself of the privilege of acting within the forum state or
causing a consequence
consequence in the forum state,"
state," and b) that the defendant
defendant
"have a substantial enough
connection
[Kentucky]
to
enough
[Kentucky] to make
93
jurisdiction . .. . reasonable."
reasonable.,,93 The second prong,
exercise of jurisdiction
however, "considers whether the cause of action arises from the
defendant's activities in the forum,"
forum," which would appear to limit
94
Kentucky
However, as
Kentucky to only exercising specific jurisdiction. 94
discussed
Kentucky court has recited that test, and
discussed above, at least one Kentucky
then gone on to suggest that if the defendant regularly
regularly conducted
conducted or
solicited business in Kentucky, then general jurisdiction
jurisdiction would
would be
be
95
95
available.
reviewing the available
available appellate
appellate decisions, Kentucky
Kentucky
available. In reviewing
appellate
appellate courts do not appear
appear to have
have upheld an exercise
exercise of general
jurisdiction, but nor have they expressly rejected
rejected it either, and instead
instead
96
topic.
the
about
statements
confusing
and
varying
have made
made varying and confusing statements about the topic. 96
Ultimately, Kentucky's
approach appears
Kentucky'S long-arm
long-arm approach
appears unclear;
unclear; it is
hoped that future cases or action by the Kentucky General Assembly
Assembly
will clarify
clarify it.
90. Cummings, 239 S.W.3d
S.W.3d at 84; accordPowers
accord Powers v.
v. Park, 192
192 S.W.3d
S.W.3d 439, 443
443 (Ky. Ct.
Ct. App.
App. 2006)
2006)
(discussing
(discussing requirements
requirements for
for exercise
exercise of
of general
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction in Kentucky
Kentucky courts).
courts).
91. Cummings, 239
91.
239 S.W.3d
S.W.3d atat 85.
85.
S.W.3d at
92. ld;
[d.; accord
accord Wilson, 85
85 S.W.3d
at 593;
593; Powers,
Powers, 192
192 S.W.3d
S.W.3d atat 442;
442; Mohler,
Mohler, 675 S.W.2d
S.W.2d at 40540506.
06.
93. Cummings, 239
239 S.W.3d
S.W.3d at 85.
94. Id.
[d.
95. Powers,
Powers, 192 S.W.3d
S.W.3d atat 443.
443.
96. See
See supra
supra text
text accompanying
accompanying notes
notes 91-95.
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Louisiana
F. Louisiana
Louisiana's long arm
arm statute
statute expressly
expressly allows
allows general
general
Louisiana's
97
97
The original
original Louisiana
Louisiana long arm statute
statute only
only provided
provided
jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction.
certain
from"
arising
to a cause of
of action
action arising
certain
jurisdiction "as to
for jurisdiction
98
98
legislature
Louisiana
the
However,
1987
Louisiana
legislature
enumerated
in
However,
acts.
enumerated
amended the
the long arm statute
statute by
by adding
adding aa catch-all
catch-all provision,
provision, which
which
amended
provisions of
of Subsection
Subsection A, a court
court of
of
"[i]n addition
addition to the provisions
provides, "[i]n
on
may exercise
exercise personal
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction over
over aa nonresident
nonresident on
this state may
constitution of this state
state and of the
consistent with the constitution
any basis consistent
99 The Louisiana
States.,,99
Louisiana Supreme
Supreme Court,
Constitution of the United States."
Constitution
amendment to the statute, has upheld
upheld
following the language of the amendment
the assertion
general personal
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction to the
the limits of
of
assertion of general
100
00
jurisdiction,
personal
constitutional
due
process.
When
analyzing
personal
analyzing
constitutional
Louisiana courts now only analyze
analyze the constitutional
constitutional due process
the Louisiana
determination under the state's long arm
requirements, forgoing any determination
requirements,
01
statute. 101
G. Mississippi
Mississippi
02 The
Mississippi's courts may also exercise general jurisdiction. 1102
language of Mississippi's long arm statue has changed over the years,
extraterritorial power of their courts. The predecessor
affecting the extraterritorial
predecessor to
Mississippi's current long arm statute only allowed the courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if the cause of action
state. 10 3 There was
contacts with the state.103
arose from the nonresident's contacts
also another statute that was supplemental to the long arm and which

STAT.
REV. STAT.
2005) (discussing
(discussing LA. REv.
784, 801
801 (La. 2005)
So. 2d
2d 784,
97.
Inc., 900 So.
Props., Inc.,900
Autozone Props.,
v. Autozone
97. Bridges
Bridges v.
long-arm statute [were] coextensive with the
of Louisiana's
Louisiana's long-ann
"the limits of
that "the
ANN.
and holding
holding that
13:3201 and
ANN. §§ \3:3201
limits of
ofconstitutional Due Process").
limits
(La. 1987)
1987) (emphasis added).
1190 (La.
2d 1188,
1188, 1190
So. 2d
98.
Corp., 513
513 So.
Avco Corp.,
Inc. v.
v. Avco
Helicopters, Inc.
98. Petroleum
Petroleum Helicopters,
13:3201(B).
ANN. §§ 13:3201(8).
REv. STAT.
STAT. ANN.
99. LA. REv.
99.
Helicopters,Inc., 513 So. 2d at
PetroleumHelicopters,
(La. 1991);
1991); Petroleum
103, 105 (La.
586 So.
So. 2d
2d 103,
Marine, 586
Reyes v.
v. Marine,
100. de
de Reyes
100.
1192.
1192.
Ct. App. 2005).
(La. Ct.
1168, 1173 (La.
917 So. 2d 1168,1173
Inst. of
ofTech.,
Tech., 917
v. Mass.
Mass. Inst.
Inc. v.
101.
Dynamics, Inc.
101. Eng'g
Eng'g Dynamics,
(Miss. 2008).
2008).
So. 2d
2d 1131, 1141 (Miss.
rel.Phillips, 992 So.
v. Phillips
Phillips ex rei.
of Jones
Jones v.
Estate of
102. Estate
102.
the prior version of
(discussing the
357, 359-60
359-60 (Miss. 1992) (discussing
609 So.
So. 2d
2d 357,
v. Fox,
Fox, 609
Transp. Co.
Co. v.
103.
S.Pac.
Pac. Transp.
103. S.
13-3-57).
MISS. CODE
CODE ANN. § 13-3-57).
MISS.
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subjected
subjected foreign corporations to personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction if the
corporation
was
doing
business
in
Mississippi,
regardless
of "whether
"whether
corporation
or not the cause of action" was related to the business activity.I04
activity. 104 The
statute allowing general
corporations was repealed
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction over corporations
repealed
in 1988 leaving the long arm statute, which was limited to specific
jurisdiction, as the only authorization to assert extraterritorial
extraterritorial
105
1
0
5
1991, when enacting the current
current version of their
power. Then, in 1991,
long arm statute, the Mississippi legislature
legislature repealed the nexus
10 6
statute. 106
of the
version
prior
the
in
contained
the long
long arm
arm statute.
requirement contained the prior version of
Thus, general jurisdiction is appropriate
appropriate under
under the current long arm
107
10 7
statute.
However, the Mississippi
Mississippi courts still employ a two-step
statute.
10 8
analysis when determining
jurisdiction exists. 108
First, the
determining if personal jurisdiction
courts will determine
determine if the elements of the long arm statute are met
and then "whether
"whether the statute's
application
statute's
application to that defendant offends
10 9
Clause."'
the Due Process Clause.,,109
H.
H. North Carolina
Carolina
interpreted North Carolina's long
The North Carolina
Carolina courts have interpreted
long
arm statute as conferring jurisdiction
jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due
IIO
l
l
process.1 As relating
relating to general
general jurisdiction, the pertinent part of
of
process.
North Carolina's long arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction
over anyone served, in any allowed action, if the party "[i]s
"[i]s engaged
engaged
in substantial activity within this State."
State."''11 I North Carolina courts
interpret this provision
"the full jurisdictional
provision as giving them ''the
jurisdictional powers

ANN. § 79-1-27
accordGross
104. MISS. CODE ANN.
79-1-27 (repealed 1988); accord
Gross v. Chevrolet County,
County, Inc.,
Inc., 655
655 So. 2d
873,
878-79 (1995).
(1995).
873,878-79
105.
Gross, 655 So.
105. Gross,
So. 2d at 878.
106. Id.;
S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 609 So.
Id.; S.
Pac. Transp.
So. 2d
2d atat 360, n.5
n.5 (discussing
(discussing the
the 1991
1991 amendment
amendment of Miss.
MIss. CODE
CODE
ANN. § 13-3-57).
107. See Estate of Jones,
107.
Jones, 992
992 So. 2d
2d atat 1139; Am. Cable
Cable Corp
Corp v. Trilogy Commc'ns., Inc.,
Inc., 754 So. 2d
545, 550 (Miss. Ct.
Ct. App. 2000).
108. Estate
ofJones,
108.
Estate of
Jones, 992 So.
So. 2d
2d atat 1137.
109. Id.
109.
Id.
110. Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 638
638 S.E.2d 203, 208
208 (N.C. 2006).
111. N.C.
1-75.4(1)(d).
III.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(1)(d).
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' 112
permissible under federal due process
pennissible
process,,112
and have asserted general
1 13
statute. l13
arm statute.
of
section
this
on
based
jurisdiction
personal
on this section of their
their long
long ann
The question of whether
whether personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction exists in North
Carolina
Carolina over a defendant
defendant who "is
"is engaged
engaged in substantial activity
activity
"question of whether
whether
within" North Carolina
Carolina thus becomes
becomes a single "question
the defendant has the minimum contacts with' 14North Carolina
process."'
of due
requirements of
necessary to meet the requirements
due process.,,114
necessary

I.
Carolina
l. South Carolina

South Carolina courts look to two sections of the South Carolina
Carolina
code when exercising
exercising extraterritorial
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The South Carolina
Carolina
code contains a traditional long arm statute that includes an
enumerated list of activities that support jurisdiction, S.C. CODE ANN.
enumerated
Il5 After the enumerated
§ 36-2-803.
36-2-803.115
enumerated list, the statute limits South
Carolina courts operating
under
this section
operating
section to the exercise of specific
116
jurisdiction. I 16
In addition to the traditional
enumerated list, S.c.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36traditional enumerated
"Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction Based
Based Upon Enduring
Enduring
2-802, entitled "Personal
Relationship," supports jurisdiction over a "person domiciled in,
Relationship,"
of, doing business, or maintaining
maintaining his or'1its
organized under the laws of,
17
of action."
any
to
as
State
this State as to any cause
principal
business in,
in, this
cause of
action. "Il7
principal place of business
This particular section
section supports the exercise
exercise of jurisdiction
jurisdiction based on
the pre-International
pre-International Shoe concepts of presence
presence and "doing
1 18 However,
business."
concluded
business."Il8
the South Carolina Supreme
Supreme Court concluded
this provision allows for the exercise
exercise of general
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction in

112.
638 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at
at 208;
208; Cambridge
Cambridge Homes
N.C. Ltd.
Hyundai Constr.,
Constr., Inc.,
Inc., 670
112. Skinner,
Skinner, 638
Homes of
of N.C.
Ltd. P'ship
P'ship v.v. Hyundai
670
S.E.2d
S.E.2d 290, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
2008).
113. Bruggeman
Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co.,
Co., 532
532 S.E.2d 215, 218
218 (N.C.
(N.C. Ct.
Ct. App. 2000).
114. Id.
Id.
115. S.C.
S.C. CODE
CODEANN.
36-2-803(A).
115.
ANN. § 36-2-803(A).
36-2-803(B) ("When
this
116. S.C. CODE
CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(8)
("When jurisdiction
jurisdiction over aa person
person is based
based solely
solely upon
upon this
section,
only aa cause
of action
acts enumerated
this section
section may
against
section, only
cause of
action arising
arising from
from acts
enumerated inin this
may be asserted
asserted against
him.")
him.") (emphasis
(emphasis added).
117. S.C.CODE
S.C.CODE ANN. § 36-2-802.
36-2-802.
117.
118. Twitchell,
Twitchell, supra
supra note
note 22 atat 621-22.
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1 19
Coggeshall v.
19
Coggeshall
v. Reproductive Endocrine
Endocrine Associates of Charlotte.
Charlotte."
concept of general
Thus, this conclusion
conclusion mixes the modem concept
jurisdiction with the more traditional notions of presence
presence in the forum
Although general
state embodied
embodied in S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-802. Although
jurisdiction does not fit cleanly
cleanly into this statute, this approach avoids
the flawed analysis of many state appellate
appellate courts-simply
courts-simply ignoring
ignoring
clear statutory
statutory provisions
provisions that limit the exercise of jurisdiction
jurisdiction to
claims "arising under" certain
certain activities.

J. Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee courts have concluded general jurisdiction
jurisdiction is available
to litigants in Tennessee. The Tennessee
Tennessee code contains
contains two sections
which address extraterritorial
extraterritorial jurisdiction,
TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-2jurisdiction,
214 and TENN. CODE ANN.
ANN. § 20-2-223.
20-2-223. Section 20-2-214 introduces
introduces a
typical enumerated list of activities with the specific
specific jurisdiction
jurisdiction
120
language,
language, "arising from."'
from.,,120 This section also includes an umbrella
umbrella
provision that supports jurisdiction
on
"[a]ny
basis
not
inconsistent
jurisdiction
"[a]ny
121 Section
with the constitution
States.,,121
constitution of this state or of the United States."
20-2-223
enumerated list of activities similar, but not
20-2-223 also contains
contains an enumerated
identical
sections contain the
20-2-214. 122 Notably, both sections
identical to, Section 20-2-214.122
123
language
language of specific jurisdiction, "arising from."'
from.,,123
Although these
together
provisions span two sections of the code, the sections bleed together
124
124
courts.
in Tennessee COurtS.
On its face, the Tennessee long arm statute contains
contains internal
inconsistencies.
Because
general
jurisdiction
is
consistent
with the
inconsistencies. Because
jurisdiction
Constitution, the umbrella provision appears to broaden the reach of
of
119. Coggeshall
Coggeshall v. Reprod.
Reprod. Endocrine
Endocrine Assocs.
Assocs. of Charlotte,
Charlotte, 655 S.E. 2d
2d 476,
476, 478 (S.C. 2007)
("General
("General jurisdiction isis the State's right toto exercise
exercise personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction over aa defendant
defendant even
even though
though
the
the suit does not
not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts
contacts with the forum;
forum; general jurisdiction
jurisdiction is
determined
determined under S.C.
S.C. Code
Code Ann.
Ann. § 36-2-802.") (internal citations
citations omitted).
20-2-214(a)(1)-(6).
120. TENN.
TENN. CODE
CODE ANN.
ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(1}--(6).
121. [d.
Id. § 20-2-214(a)(6).
20-2-214(a)(6).
121.
ANN. §
§ 20-2-223.
122. TENN.
TENN. CODE
CODE ANN.
§§ 20-2-214,
123. TENN.
TENN. CODE
CODE ANN. §§
20-2-214, 20-2-223.
124. Gregurek
Gregurek v.v. Swope
Swope Motors, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 882, 884 (Tenn.
(Tenn. Ct.
Ct. App. 2003)
2003) ("The trial
trial court
court
found
§§ 20found jurisdiction over
over Swope
Swope Motors
Motors based
based on Tennessee's long-arm statute, Tenn.
Tenn. Code
Code Ann. §§
2-214,
20-2-223.").
2-214,20-2-223.").
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Tennessee long ann
arm statute to include the exercise of general
the Tennessee
125
12 5
jurisdiction.
Yet, the Tennessee legislature did not address the
"arise from" aa specific list of
of
limitation that the cause of action "arise
actions. The Tennessee legislature simply added the umbrella
provision to the list of activities
activities that support jurisdiction in response
to efforts in Rhode Island and California to expand
expand their long arm
126 Thus, the full
statutes to the limits of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment. 126
ann statute is unclear.
reach of the Tennessee long arm
Gegurek v. Swope Motors,
Motors, Inc., the Tennessee Court of Appeals
In Gegurek
27
reviewed the nature of specific and general
jurisdiction'127
general jurisdiction
and
concluded
the
defendant's
contacts
with
Tennessee
did
not
rise
to
the
concluded
1
28
"continuous and systematic."
systematic.' 128 In coming to this conclusion,
level of "continuous
Appeals held out the possibility of general
the Tennessee
Tennessee Court of Appeals
jurisdiction, which would be permitted under the umbrella provision,
but declined to exercise
exercise it. 129 Like the Tennessee legislature, the
Gegurek court declined to deal with the "arising from" limitation
limitation
contained in the statute.
K Texas
K.
Although general jurisdiction exists in Texas,
Texas, the long arm statute
presence as the
seems fully entrenched
entrenched in the traditional concept of presence
130
1
3
0
basis for power
power over a defendant.
defendant. The Texas statute
statute operates with
an expansive definition for "doing business"
business" in the State
State of Texas:

In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a
nonresident: (1)
nonresident does business
business in this state if the nonresident:
either
contracts by mail or otherwise
otherwise with a Texas resident
resident and either
party is to perform
the
contract
in
whole
or
in
part
in
this
state;
perform
contract
part
125.
TENN. CODE ANN.
125. TENN.
ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(6).
20-2-214(a)(6).
126.
Robert Banks,
Banks, Jr.,
Jr., The Future
Future of
of General
General Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in Tennessee, 27
27 U.
U. MEM.
MEM. L.
L. REv. 559,
559,
126. Robert
581 (1997).
(1997).
127.
127. Gregurek,
Gregurek, 138
138 S.W.3d at 884-85.
884-85.
128.
128. Id.
Id. at 885.
885.
129.
129. Id.
!d. at884-85.
at 884-85.
130.
17.041-.045
130. TEx.
TEx. Crv.
CIV. PRAc.
!'RAe. &
& REMEDIES
REMEDIES CODEANN.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045
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1199
1199

(2)
(2) commits
commits aa tort in
in whole
whole or in part in
in this state; or
or (3) recruits
Texas
Texas residents,
residents, directly
directly or
or through
through an
an intermediary
intermediary31located
located in
131
state.
this
outside
or
inside
employment
for
state,
this state,
employment inside or outside this state.
business,"
The
The statute
statute then takes this expansive definition
definition for "doing
"doing business,"
and appoints the secretary of state
state as an agent
agent for service of process
process
but
does
not
this
state,
"a nonresident
nonresident who engages
engages in business in
not
for "a
maintain
maintain a regular
regular place of business in this state
state or a designated
designated agent
process, in any proceeding
proceeding that arises out
out of the
for service
service of process,
132
a
is
nonresident
the
which
to
and
state
this
party.,,132
business done in
which the nonresident is a party."'
business
The Texas statute
statute provides
provides an
an expansive
expansive definition of "doing
"doing
business"; however, it lacks
lacks any provision which
which actually confers
confers
business";
jurisdiction
jurisdiction over
over any
any person
person or entity
entity "doing
"doing business"
business" in the state.
secretary of state in the state serves as the basis
The presence
presence of the secretary
basis
33
1
long
While
the
Texas
for jurisdiction
jurisdiction over nonresident
nonresident defendants. 133
arm operates
operates in an unusual fashion, it contains
contains the familiar specific
specific
the business
"ariseout of
that the proceeding
jurisdiction
o/the
business
jurisdiction requirement
requirement
proceeding "arise
134
state."'
this
in
done
state.,,134
The Texas Supreme
Supreme Court has seized
seized on the non-exclusive
non-exclusive nature
of what qualifies
qualifies as "doing
"doing business"
business" to expand
expand Texas
Texas long arm
arm
135 Noting
jurisdiction to the full limits of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment. 135
the Supreme
Supreme Court's endorsement
endorsement of general jurisdiction, the Texas
the availability of general jurisdiction
Court
presumed
Supreme
Supreme
"arising out of' language contained in §§
without addressing
addressing the "arising
17.044(b).
17
.044(b). After reviewing the basic concept of general
general jurisdiction,
the Texas Supreme Court endorsed
endorsed the view of Professors
Professors Twitchell

131. Id.
Id.§ 17.042.
17.042.
131.
Id § 17.044(b).
17.044(b).
132. Id.
Id.
133. Id.
added).
Id. (emphasis
(emphasis added).
134. Id.
L.P. v.
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2007) ("[The Texas
135. PHC-Minden,
PHC-Minden, L.P.
135.
courts to
to exercise
exercise jurisdiction
statute permits
permits Texas
Texas courts
long-arm] statute
long-arm]
jurisdiction over
over aa nonresident defendant
defendant that 'does
'does
'doing business.'
business.' The list,
statute identifies
some activities
Texas, and
and the
business' inin Texas,
the statute
identifies some
activities that
that constitute
constitute 'doing
business'
exclusive. We
however,
however, isis not
not exclusive.
We have held that section 17.042's language extends Texas courts' personal
jurisdiction
jurisdiction 'as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit."')
permit."') (internal
citations omitted).
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136

"dispute-blind."'
"true" general jurisdiction is "dispute-blind.,,136
and Rhodes that "true"
Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court focused on the "continuous
37
systematic" language of Helicopteros.
and systematic"
Helicopteros.1137
The Texas Supreme
Court then examined the contacts of a Louisiana hospital with the
state of Texas: two trips to Texas by employees of the hospital for
business meetings, numerous payments to hospital vendors over the
138
entities. 138
Texas entities.
involving Texas
contracts involving
and three
years, and
eight years,
previous
previous eight
three contracts
The court
court concluded
concluded that these contacts did not rise to the level of
of
The
"continuous
and
systematic"
and
declined
to
exercise
"continuous 39and systematic" and declined
general
jurisdiction. 139
jurisdiction.'
L. Virginia
Virginia
L.
Notwithstanding the state long arm statute, general jurisdiction
Notwithstanding
exists in Virginia. The Virginia
Virginia long arm statute allows for personal
jurisdiction over a person as to causes of action arising from an
140
enumerated list of activities. 14o
enumerated
When jurisdiction
jurisdiction is based on the
Virginia long arm statute, Virginia courts are limited only to causes
14 1
of action "arising
"arising from acts enumerated
enumerated in this section.'
section.,,141
The
of
Virginia Supreme Court, however, has found that the doctrine of
jurisdiction simply falls outside the confines of the state long
general jurisdiction
142
arm statute. 142 Under the Virginia Supreme
Court's interpretation,
interpretation,
Supreme Court's
"the
long-ann
statute
does
not
address
the
doctrine of general
"the long-arm
jurisdiction
jurisdiction arising out of significant
significant presence
presence of a party in
143
Virginia.,
Virginia.,,143
The Virginia
Virginia Supreme
Supreme Court thus reaches
reaches outside the
of
confines of the Virginia
Virginia long arm statute
statute to seize
seize the concept
concept of
general
jurisdiction,
rather
than
try
to
fit
it
into
a specific
general jurisdiction,
try
specific jurisdiction
jurisdiction
statute. Because
state
courts
have
historically
relied
upon
the state
Because
historically
136.
(internal citation
136. Id.
Id at
at 168-69
168-69 (quoting
(quoting Twitchel, supra
supra note
note 2,2, atat 613
613 (internal
citation omitted)).
omitted».
137.
137. PHC-Minden,
PHC-Minden, 235
235 S.W.3d
S.W.3d atat 166-68,
166-68, (citing Helicopteros
Helicopteros Nacionales
Nacionales de
de Colombia, S.A.
S.A. v.v. Hall,
Hal~
466
466 U.S.
u.s. 408 (1984)).
(1984».
138.
170-71.
138. PHC-Minden,
PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d
S.W.3d atat 170-71.
139.
139. Id.
Id. at
at 171.
171.
140.
140. VA.
VA. CODE
CODE ANN.
ANN. §§ 8.01-328.1(A).
8.01-328.I(A).
141.
141. Id.
Id. § 8.01-328.1(C)
8.01-328.1(C)
142.
142. Witt
Witt v. Reynolds
Reynolds Metals
Metals Co.,
Co., 397
397 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 873,
873, 875
875 (Va.
(Va. 1990).
1990).
143.
143. Id.
Id
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arm statute as a basis for exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction,
long ann
exercising extraterritorial
this analysis
jurisdiction
analysis represents somewhat of a shift in personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence.
jurisprudence. This analysis, however, recognizes that a long arm
ann
statute with an enumerated
enumerated list and an arising under limitation,
properly
exercise of general
properly read, does not comport with the exercise
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

A. Survey Results
A.
Results
All of the eleven Southern states other than Georgia
Georgia examined
examined in
this survey permit their courts to exercise
exercise general
general jurisdiction,
jurisdiction,
although
there
is
diversity
in
how
they
reach
that
result.
In
six of the
although
jurisdictions,
jurisdictions, the applicable statute or regulation explicitly provides
that the courts
courts may exercise
exercise personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction to the limits
144
Georgia's other
permitted by federal due process requirements. l44
Georgia'S
other
five Southern
neighbors
have
achieved
general
jurisdiction
through
Southern
jurisdiction
an expansive
expansive reading
reading of their long-arm
long-ann provisions by their state
45
courts. 1145
courts.
B. Recommendations
Georgia
Recommendations for Georgia
As discussed above, Georgia is currently
currently a specific jurisdiction146
only state. 146 Georgia
Georgia is alone among its Southern neighbors
neighbors in
choosing
to
continue
to
artificially
limit
the
jurisdictional
reach of its
choosing
artificially
courts. Ironically, a Georgia plaintiff is more likely to be able to sue a
nonresident
Georgia
nonresident defendant
defendant in a federal court in Georgia
Georgia than in a Georgia
147
1
47
state court-subject
court-subject matter jurisdiction
jurisdiction questions aside. This odd
situation exists because federal courts in Georgia exercise general
jurisdiction
process-notwithstanding the
jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process-notwithstanding
144. The six jurisdictions with an explicit statutory or procedural
procedural grant of general
general jurisdiction
jurisdiction are
Alabama, Arkansas,
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Mississippi, and Tennessee.
145. These five states are Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
Virginia.
146. See text accompanying
accompanying notes 67-84.
accompanying text.
147. See supra
supra note 72 and accompanying
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language of the Georgia long-arm statute and consistent interpretation
of it by Georgia courts as only providing specific jurisdiction-while
permit a Georgia
the Georgia General Assembly has chosen not to pennit
resident (or other plaintiffs) to sue a nonresident defendant on a cause
48 As
defendant's contacts with Georgia. 148
not arising from the defendant's
discussed above, however, the Georgia Court of Appeals'
Appeals' recent
decision in Coleman
Colemon has created uncertainty about whether Georgia
statutory language and insist that
courts will continue to adhere to the statutory
the cause of action arise from the defendant's
defendant's contacts with
149
Georgia. 149
The Georgia General Assembly should remedy this situation by
by
permitting Georgia courts to exercise
exercise personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction to the
pennitting
limits imposed by the 14th Amendment. The cleanest
cleanest way to do this
would be to repeal the current long-arm
long-ann statute and replace it with
150
something
like
Arkansas's
statute.
something
150 Such a statute would simply
state that Georgia's
"shall have personal
Georgia's courts "shall
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction of all
persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum
of the Fourteenth
extent permitted
pennitted by the due process
process of law clause
'1 51
States Constitution."
Amendment of the United States
Constitution.,,151
Failing
alternatively add a residuary clause
Failing that, Georgia
Georgia should alternatively
clause to
the current
long-arm statute-possibly
statute-possibly making other revisions to the
current long-ann
concurrently-resembling the one Louisiana added,
current prongs concurrently-resembling
which
reads
"[i]n
provisions of Subsection A, a court
which
"[i]n addition to the provisions
exercise personal
of this state may exercise
personal jurisdiction
jurisdiction over a nonresident
nonresident on
on
any
constitution of this state and of the
any basis
basis consistent
consistent with the constitution
Constitution
States."' 152 Two Southern states have
Constitution of the United States.,,152
have used
this approach, i.e.,
adding
a
catch-all
clause
to
an
enumerated listi.e., adding
enumerated
type long-arm
long-arm statute, although
one
that
did
it
a
while ago has
although
recently
enumerated list, presumably
recently jettisoned
jettisoned the enumerated
presumably as redundant
redundant and

148.
149.
149.
150.
151.
151.
152.

See supra
supra text accompanying
accompanying notes 67-84.
67-84.
See
See supra
supra notes
notes 73-84
73-84 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
See ARK.
ARK. CODE
CODE ANN.
ANN. §16-4-101(B).
§16-4-IOI(B).
Id.
Id
LA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3201(B).
LA. REV.
REv. STAT.
13:3201(B).
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53 If Georgia
potentially confusing. 1ls3
Georgia decided to
to go this route,
route, it would
would
potentially
language
also need
need to either amend
amend or
or simply
simply delete
delete the
the preamble
preamble language in
in
also
cause
requiring that the 154
cause of
of action "aris[e]
"aris[e] from"
from"
O.G.C.A. § 9-10-91 requiring
O.G.C.A.
the defendant's
defendant's contacts
contacts with
with Georgia.
Georgia. 154
the
However the General
However
General Assembly
Assembly chooses
chooses to proceed, it would
thereby
thereby "provide
"provide the maximum protection
protection for Georgia
Georgia residents
damaged by the out-of-state
out-of-state acts or omissions
omissions committed by
nonresident tortfeasors"
tortfeasors" constitutionally
constitutionally possible, something
something no
nonresident
55
Action by the
the General
General Assembly
Assembly would also
Georgian should
should fear. 155
1 Action
Georgian
Colemon
decision
by
the
recent
created
the
ambiguity
resolve
decision and
and
created
the recent
choices about
Georgia
that basic choices
about policy
policy and the jurisdiction
jurisdiction of Georgia
ensure that
156
are made by the
the legislative
legislative branch
branch rather
rather than
than the
the judiciary.
judiciary. 156
courts are

153. The Southern jurisdictions
jurisdictions that have aa residuary clause in addition toto an enumerated list
list are
only uses
a catch-all
catch-all clause
clause but
but now
enumerated list
list and
and a
Alabama had
had an
Louisiana
an enumerated
now only
uses the
Louisiana and
and Tennessee.
Tennessee. Alabama
catch-all
clause.
catch-all clause.
text.
69 and
and accompanying
accompanying text.
notes 67,
67, 69
9-10-91; accord
accordsupra
154. O.C.G.A.
154.
o.C.G.A. § 9-10-91;
supra notes
ofAmes,
v. First
FirstNat
Nat7I
ConsultingServs., LLC
Innovative Clinical
Clinical &
155. Innovative
& Consulting
LLC v.
'I Bank of
Ames, 620
620 S.E. 2d
2d 352, 355
and relief
relief
to provide
provide such
such protection
continued failure
failure to
the General
General Assembly's
Assembly's continued
(Ga. 2005)
(lamenting the
(Ga.
2005) (lamenting
protection and
Georgia residents).
residents).
for Georgia
for
text.
notes 73-81
and accompanying
accompanying text.
156. See supra
supra notes
73-81 and
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